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Title: BotFlowMon: Identify Social Bot Traffic with NetFlow and Machine Learning 
 
 
With the rapid development of online social networks (OSN), maintaining the 
security of social media ecosystems becomes dramatically important for public. Among 
all the security threats in OSN, malicious social bot is the most common risk factor.  
This paper puts forward a detection method called BotFlowMon that only utilize 
NetFlow data to identify OSN bot traffic. The detection procedure takes the raw NetFlow 
data as input and use DBSCAN algorithm to aggregate related flows into transaction 
level data. Then a special data fusion technique along with a visualization method are 
proposed to extract features, normalize values and help analyzing flows. A new clustering 
algorithm called Clustering Based on Density Sort and Valley Point Competition is also 
designed to subdivide transactions into basic operations. After the above preprocessing 
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The definition of online social networks (OSN) encompasses networking for 
business, pleasure, and all points in between. Over the past decades, we have witnessed 
the rapid expansion of OSN. Based on the statistics from Q1 2018, Facebook achieved 
more than 2.196 billion active users around the world, and twitter also reached 336 
million.  
With such a boom, the security of OSN becomes a severe problem worthy of our 
concern. OSNs are increasingly threatened by social bots (E Ferrara, 2016), which are 
software-controlled social accounts and visitors that mimic human users or crawl for 
private data with abnormal intentions (J Zhang, 2016). In fact, not all the social bots are 
malicious, lots of companies and institution use bots for customer service and 
information spreading. However, there have been reports on various attacks, abuses, and 
manipulations based on social bots (E Ferrara, 2015), such as infiltrating Facebook (Y 
Boshmaf, 2011) or Twitter (L Bilge, 2009), launching spam campaign (H Gao, 2010), 
performing financial fraud and conducting political astroturf (J Ratkiewicz, 2011). 
The Existing works to detect bots on OSNs need to utilize the network topology, 
private data in payload or account activity histories, which is sensitive and might violate 
privacy. In this paper, a new detection method called BotFlowMon is proposed that inputs 
flow level data such as Cisco's NetFlow (B Claise, 2004) to differentiate social bots 
traffic from legitimate (human) traffic.  From NetFlow data, we can just get low volume, 
coarse-grained, non-application specific data (R Sommer, 2002) and cannot touch the 
sensitive payload information, making this approach privacy-preserving and can be 
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deployed by telecommunications companies like AT&T and Xfinity, also adds challenges 
to detection procedure. While with the help of some data fusion and machine learning 
techniques, it is possible to identify social bot traffic in such scenario. 
This BotFlowMon system uses labeled NetFlow data (social bot traffic versus 
legitimate traffic) as ground truth and utilize four important modules to perform the 
classification. (1) The aggregation module transfers the raw NetFlow data into transaction 
level dataset to make the characteristics obvious for detection. (2) Flow fingerprint 
generation module extract features from transaction level dataset and normalize the 
features into matrix. In this step, a flow fingerprint visualization method is also 
developed to help analysis. (3) The subdivision module cut each transaction into more 
basic operations, which accelerates the learning model to converge and reduce the data 
volume requirement for training. (4) Machine learning module, takes the preprocessed 





In order to maintain secure and harmonious online social environments for public 
users, network security community has been developing innovative techniques to identify 
bot users effectively. According to the different kinds of data the techniques require, we 
can generally classify the detection approaches into three categories: (A) content-based 
detection approaches, (B) detection methods based on OSN topology, (C) approaches 
require crowdsourcing on posts and profile analysis (A Karataş, 2011). There are some 
other approaches that may be the mixture of these three categories. No doubt, they have 
great performances on identifying specific types of OSN bots, but to a certain degree, the 
sensitive data they require to utilize intrude upon users' privacy, making these approaches 
difficult to be extensively used. 
Content-Based Approach 
The key idea of content-based bot detection method is to observe the differences 
between human being and bot in terms of tweet contents, activity histories and linguistic 
features. Nowadays, big data is exploding as more and more information is collected and 
stored, it becomes much easier to fetch massive labeled data from ISPs. Meanwhile, 
benefitting from rapid development of machine learning, nature language processing and 
semantic analysis, constructing a classification model to classify bots becomes very 
efficacious. Lots of great content-based detection approaches have been proposed: 
"BotOrNot" (CA Davis, 2016), as the first social bot detection framework publicly 
available for Twitter, analyzed 15k manually verified social bots and 16k legitimate 
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accounts and achieved 86\% accuracy; SentiBot (JP Dickerson, 2014), relies on tweet 
syntax, semantics and user behaviors to distinguish human and social bots.  
The limitations of this approach are that large volume of high-quality labeled 
social data is required for the analysis process and the collection of the data needs to be 
carefully performed to avoid invasion of privacy. Moreover, as bots are becoming more 
and more sophisticated by using AI powered techniques, this approach is facing 
unprecedented challenges. 
Topology-Based Approach 
Approaches based on topology (social network structure) focus on detecting 
amplification bots and Sybil account. For these attacks, multiple accounts are controlled 
by one master, so we can assume that these malicious accounts are connected to each 
other and have some similar attributes. Once the topology structure of the network is 
acknowledged, some methods like Random Walk, Bayesian Network and Loopy Belief 
Propagation can be applied to identify malicious accounts. In 2009, SybilInfer (G 
Danezis, 2009) utilizes the combination of Bayesian inference and Monte-Carlo sampling 
techniques to estimate the set of legitimate and Sybil accounts; Sybilbelief (NZ Gong, 
2014), identifies Sybil nodes with low false positive rates and low false negative rates by 
using Markov Random Field and Belief Propagation. 
CrowdSourcing-Based Approach 
As crowdsourcing is becoming a valuable method for companies and researchers 
to measure scores for tasks, some bot detection schemas based on crowdsourcing have 
been put forward. In 2012, Gang Wang (G Wang, 2012) constructed a two-layered bot 
detection system containing filtering and crowdsourcing layer. The leverage of this 
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strategy faces two fundamental issues. First, it is hard to manage security and privacy 
issues, strict policy should be implemented when sharing the information with the crowd 
to prevent privacy leaks. Second, it is expensive to keep the system running both duo to 





NetFlow is a feature that was introduced on Cisco routers that provides the ability 
to collect IP network traffic as it enters or exits an interface. Initially, it is invented for 
monitoring overall network traffic, so the information we can leverage from NetFlow is 
very basic and limited, only contains partial attributes from the header of IP datagram. 
The configuration of the NetFlow is shown in the table below: 
Table 1 
Configuration of NetFlow 
Configuration of NetFlow 
Start Time Input Interface num 
End Time Output Interface num 
Duration Packets 
Protocol Bytes 
Source Address Flows 
Destination Address Packets 
Source Address Port TCP Flags 
Destination Address Port ToS 
Source Port bits per second 
Destination Port packets per second 
Source AS Bytes per package 
Destination AS  
 
The datasets we use to construct and test BotFlowMon come from two sources: 
traffic generated and gathered from our own computers and routers, which has superior 
flexibility and conveniences for simulation and experiments; datasets generated and 
collected from University of Oregon's campus traffic, although it is a relatively small ISP, 
still offers realistic scenario verification tests.  
For legitimate flows, no API related scripts can be used during the data creation 
process, so we created and labeled the legitimate traffic flow by manually doing normal 
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daily operations on Twitter and Facebook. For social bot traffic, a variety of social bot 
programs are used to perform bot activities on Twitter and Facebook. The traffic of them 
are collected and labeled as the ground truth. In order to have a comprehensive social bot 
simulation and fetch highly credible labeled data, we categorize the social bots to four 
types by implementation mechanisms: (A) chat bot, the program or artificial intelligence 
based script which conducts a conversation via auditory or textual methods; (B)poster 
bot, automatically disseminates fraud information, spam and commercial promotions by 
tweeting, posting and commenting; (C) amplification bot, massively amplifies certain 
messages or conduct speculations by working as fake follower or forwarding robot; (D) 
OSN crawler, a programmed spider that systematically browses and collect private data 
for malicious intentions. 
Chat Bot 
Chat bots are very active on messaging applications such as Twitter DM, 
Facebook Messenger or WeChat. They can be artificial intelligence powered or simply 
logic-based programs that automatically perform conversations with normal users for 
unusual purposes. 
The simulation of this abnormal behavior relies on some widely used chat bot 
frameworks, APIs and open-sourced programs such as botmaster (RS Wallace, 2003), 
Ontbot (H AI-Zubaide, 2011) and python-twitter API. We created hundreds of Twitter 
and Facebook accounts and performed these chat bot programs only for research purpose. 
Multitudinous flow traffic of the conversations between human beings and these chat bots 
are collected, with different frequencies, response times and transmission contents 
(include images, audio files, texts and hyperlinks). 
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Poster Bot 
Benefitting from easily used official and third-party APIs, poster bot becomes the 
most common social bot in OSN. They have started to distribute spam tweets and 
Facebook posts which can be broadly defined as unwanted that contains malicious URLs 
in most cases or occasionally malicious texts (J Zhang, 2016) (C Grier, 2010). These 
malicious URLs could cause financial, privacy losses to the users and pollute the social 
network environment. According to a study in 2010 (C Grier, 2010), roughly 8% of the 
URLs in tweets are malicious ones that direct users to scams, malware and phishing sites, 
and about 0.13% of the spam URLs will be clicked. 
In order to collect data for designing effective spam defenses, we wrote several 
poster bot programs based on APIs such as Tweepy (J Roesslein, 2009) and Facebook 
API (W Graham, 2008). We ran these bots program during different time periods to post 
some harmless messages that contained textual contents, tiny videos, images and external 
links on Twitter and Facebook. The related NetFlow traffic data in different activity rates 
and network environments are collected to enrich the training dataset. 
Amplification Bot 
Amplification bot, benefits from its large volume, can be easily used to create 
some heat topics for commercial purposes and defraudations. Without creating new 
contents, amplification bots often work as fake followers, those Twitter or Facebook 
accounts specifically created to inflate the number of followers of a target account. Fake 
followers are dangerous for the social platform and beyond, since they may alter concepts 
like popularity and influence in the Twittersphere, hence impacting on economy, politics, 
 9 
and society (S Cresci, 2015). It also serves as forwarding and liking robot, popularizes 
some unwanted junk information and helps commercial promotion. 
From its operation mechanism, most amplification bots are sybil accounts, 
powered by a large botnet and have one bot master to send commands. Since the social 
topology is unknown in NetFlow data, we only need to simulate each amplification bot's 
interactions with OSNs. OAuth (D Hardt, 2012) software is used for token management 
and switching accounts. API-based bot scripts are also implemented for amplification bot 
simulation. 
OSN Crawler 
OSNs such as Facebook and Twitter, contain valuable data about millions of users 
that coveted by commercial institutions and fraudulent groups. The core functionality of 
OSNs is enabling users to share slices of life, personal perspectives and profiles, 
however, can be exploited by crawlers to aggregate data about large numbers of OSN 
users for re-publication or other more nefarious purposes that violate users' privacy and 
security. 
There are two kinds of OSN crawlers in social networks. One is API-based, which 
relies on a relative large botnet and to dig users' private sensitive date. Because in OSNs, 
lots of users' information can only be seen by their friends, so a large amount of bots are 
need to get access to privacy efficiently. Once the relationship is built, private data can be 
easily fetched with basic API functions. 
Another kind of OSN crawler is page crawler, instead of using API privileges, it 
directly reads the HTML files of OSNs and utilize regular expression to extract target 
information. The NetFlow traffic of this bot has large resemblance to normal users' 
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traffic, but still differs on flow density, operation regularity and frequency, making the 
trace detectable if properly analyzed. 





The flow chart of the BotFlowMon is shown in the figure 1. For the NetFlow data 
from University of Oregon campus traffic, a precise preprocessing step is designed to 
denoise, filter irrelevant flows, recognize labeled traffic and extract only OSN related 
NetFlow. For traffic generated and collected from our own experimental platforms, noise 
reduction and OSN flow extraction steps are still required to obtain pure data. Then, the 
aggregation module uses DBSCAN (M Ester, 1996) algorithm to aggregate correlative 
flows into a group data that can represent user's transaction. We designed a data fusion 
method called Bot Flow Fingerprint and implemented in the flow fingerprint generation 
module to extract normalized features, also makes the data suitable for machine learning. 
Finally, the subdivision module and machine learning module collaborate to output one 
classification model that has satisfactory accuracy. 
 
Figure 1. Flow chart for BotFlowMon 
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Preprocessing 
For NetFlow data from campus traffic, the first indispensable step is grouping 
flows by user. In campus network environment, thousands of users' network traffic are 
mixed together, we need to settle each single user's flows into one group by matching IP 
address and address port number. For data amassed from our own experimental 
platforms, this process can be skipped because we strictly controlled that only one user's 
operations can be performed at one time. 
Then, a filtration machine is constructed to wipe out flows with zero Byte, zero 
duration, irrelevant protocols (such as ICMP) and external flows that pass by edge router. 
For now, we have relatively clean NetFlows, but we still need to extract the traffic 
flows only related with the OSNs. The basic thought is for each flow, we check its 
interaction IP addresses to test whether it belongs to Facebook, Twitter or other social 
websites. However, one concern is the IP blocks of the OSNs may change over time, and 
each OSN has a huge number of IP blocks. It is difficult to build a static IP library to 
accurately match the result.  The breakthrough is that autonomous systems will update 
router tables to maintain network reachability information, the access to the dynamic 
router table enables us to match the most updated and historical accurate IP blocks. With 
those information, a IP block library can be built dynamically to help the extraction 
process. In order to obtain that information, BGP stream (C Orsini, 2016) is used in this 
step. BGP stream is an open-source software framework for the analysis of both historical 
and real-time Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) measurement data. Those BGP data 
contain the updated and historical router information including the router tables. By using 
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the BGPStream API, we can look up what IP blocks are forwarded to Facebook and 
Twitter at different time. 
The IP address matching process is implemented with the longest prefix match 
algorithm (T Hayashi, 1999), which refers to an algorithm used by routers in Internet 
Protocol (IP) networking to select an entry from a forwarding table. The algorithm also 
needs to be executed in parallel, because for one single day, there could be more than 
100GB data generated from campus traffic and around 500MB data collected from our 
small experimental platform. The parallelization can significantly increase the efficiency 
of the processing. 
With the help of BGP stream and parallelized longest prefix match algorithm, we 
are able to efficiently extract the only OSN related flow data. Although there still could 
contain some tiny noise in the grouped data such as traffic delivered by CDN protocol, 
sufficient detailed traffic flows are obtained for analysis and would not affect final result. 
Aggregation 
Inasmuch as the little information flow-level data contains, DBSCAN (M Ester, 
1996), a density-based clustering algorithm, is used to aggregate the related flows into 
one transaction, so that the features of both malicious and legitimate traffic become 
conspicuous and make it feasible to distinguish. Here, transaction refers to that one user 
performs several operations on OSN for some purposes in a relatively short time period. 
For example, a transaction can be taking 30 seconds to reply some messages through 
Facebook Messenger or tweeting 20 anomalous hyperlinks on twitter within one minute. 
We treat flows as points scattered on timeline, DBSCAN groups together points 
that are closely packed together (points with many nearby neighbors), marking as outliers 
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points that lie alone in low-density regions (whose nearest neighbors are too far away). 
This one-dimensional DBSCAN algorithm will be used to group the data by taking two 
parameters as threshold values, one is density threshold value minPts, refers to bits per 
second (bps) in this case; one is radius threshold value ε, refers to time interval between 
flows. Based on experimental results, we set minPts as 1500 bps, a relatively small value 
for OSN traffic, because some EventListeners in web scripts and API programs 
frequently generate some tiny streams between users and OSN servers, these traffic 
should definitely be included instead of being labeled as outliers. We set ε as relatively 
large values between 10 to 20 seconds, because lots of people may spend some time on 
reading content on OSN, with no or very few NetFlow data created during this time 
period, but it still needs to be treated as a single transaction. Moreover, if we get very 
large patterns after the aggregation process, we can still cut this pattern into pieces in the 
following steps to fix the complexity problem, but there are no ways to fix if we get very 
tiny patterns containing too few information. 
In addition, as a solution for getting a grip on complexity, one transaction's time 
duration should be in the range of 1.5 seconds to 60 seconds. Any transactions shorter 
than that range will be discarded as noise (could be OSN notifications or status checking 
traffic) and any transactions longer than that range will force to be divided evenly until 
qualified. 
Flow Fingerprint Generation 
After the aggregation process, we can obtain transactions level data represented 
by different numbers of flows. In order to easily apply machine learning algorithms to 
train classification models, we need encode the transactions into normalized data, 
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transferring both numerical attributes and symbolic attributes into the same format. Here, 
a data fusion method named Flow Fingerprint along with a visualization method are 
proposed for this reason. 
The basic idea of the Flow Fingerprint approach is to transfer the aggregated 
flows to a 6 × 200 matrix shown as the table below. For each transaction level data, it 
contains specific number of flows that have different start time and end time. The 
transaction itself also has an overall start and end time. We perform equal division to 
partition the transaction time duration into 200 pieces and extract features from each 
piece to fill each column of the matrix respectively. 
Table 2 
Configuration of Flow Fingerprint matrix 
Flow Fingerprint matrix 
1: outgoing traffic bps bps𝑜1, bps𝑜2, bps𝑜3,… , bps𝑜200 
2: outgoing traffic pps pps𝑜1, pps𝑜2, pps𝑜3,… , pps𝑜200 
3: outgoing traffic ToS tos𝑜1, tos𝑜2, tos𝑜3, … , tos𝑜200 
4: incoming traffic bps bps𝑖1, bps𝑖2, bps𝑖3,… , bps𝑖200 
5: incoming traffic pps pps𝑖1, pps𝑖2, pps𝑖3,… , pps𝑖200 
6: incoming traffic ToS tos𝑖1, tos𝑖2, tos𝑖3,… , tos𝑖200 
 
Row 1 to row 3 are features extracted from outgoing NetFlows, while row 4 to 
row 6 are features extracted from incoming NetFlows. They both take bits per second 
(bps), packets per second (pps) and type of service (ToS) as data entries. At one moment, 
several different flows could overlap, so the bps and pps values should be the 
accumulation of the overlap NetFlows. Let F be the set of flows overlapped at time t, the 





pps(t) = ∑𝑓. 𝑝𝑝𝑠
𝑓∈𝐹
 
ToS, a 8-bit field that becomes increasingly important as voice and video gain 
popularity on today's social networks. It is used for prioritizing traffic to guarantee high 
quality datagram transmission service. As it is a symbolic value, we only fill the 
dominating flow's ToS value into the matrix when several flows overlapped. Here, 
dominating flow means the flow has the largest bps value at the moment. There is one 
concern that in NetFlow system, two bits of ToS field are reserved for customization, 
theoretically, ISPs can rewrite the whole ToS field for differentiated demands, which 
means the classification model may not be universal. So, we will train another 
classification model only utilizing 4 × 200 matrix (incoming and outgoing ToS are wiped 
off) as a comparison. This comparison model would be more generally applicable but has 
weaker performance. 
The normalization of the matrix is based on the dispersion of bps, pps and ToS 
values in the entire network. In order to achieve that, we fetched 235GB NetFlow data 
from campus traffic including internal router flows and performed the same matrix 
transformation procedure on these data. Then create a new dataset that have the same 
number of values that evenly distribute in the range of 0 to 255. Three gigantic quantile to 
quantile plots are drawn based on these two dataset to represent the dispersions of bps, 
pps and ToS values respectively (figure 2 and 3 are the quantile to quantile plots of bps 
and pps). From now on, three value mapping functions 𝑓𝑟(𝑏𝑝𝑠), 𝑓𝑔(𝑝𝑝𝑠) and 𝑓𝑔(𝑡𝑜𝑠) can 
be constructed to normalize the matrix values into the range of 0 to 255 based on the 
quantile to quantile plots. The final matrix is called flow fingerprint. 
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Figure 2. Quantile to Quantile plot of NetFlow size and Number of Packets 
 
Figure 3. Quantile to Quantile plot of TOS 
Why should we normalize the matrix values into 0 to 255? Actually, in the 
machine learning step, we still convert them into the range of 0 to 1 to fit training 
algorithms, but for now, we can easily visualize the matrix for better observation and 
analysis with the 0 to 255 range. We visualize the 6 × 200 matrix to two colorful bars in 
standard RGB space with the length of 200 pixels.  
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Figure 4. A transaction lasting for 35.74s, containing 220 NetFlows. 
Figure 4 is an example of the visualized flow fingerprint, which represents a 
legitimate user that spent 35.74 seconds browsing Facebook and reloaded the page twice 
during this transaction. The beginning and ending position of the image represent the 
starting time and ending time of the transaction. The bar above denotes the outgoing 
traffic, while the bar beneath denotes the incoming traffic. The RGB value of each pixel 
is calculated by the following equation. By figuring out the difference value with 255, 
column lager bps and pps values tends have deeper color while column with smaller bps 
and pps values tends to have lighter color. 
RGB(bps, pps, tos) = (255 − 𝑓𝑟(𝑏𝑝𝑠), 255 − 𝑓𝑔(𝑝𝑝𝑠), 255 − 𝑓𝑏(𝑡𝑜𝑠)) 
Some more examples are shown in figure 5. Flow fingerprint 1 and 2 are two 
users conducting a conversation with each other through Twitter DM, the difference is 
flow fingerprint 1 was generated by legitimate user while flow fingerprint 2 was 
generated by a chat bot; Flow fingerprint 3 was created by a poster bot, using API to 
tweet textual messages on Twitter for every 3 seconds; Flow fingerprint 4 is a hybrid bot, 
crawling friends' photo albums and posting link spams at the same time. 
 19 
 
Figure 5. More Flow Fingerprint examples 
Flow Subdivision 
After the previous preprocessing steps, we already have normalized dataset can 
perfectly fit machine learning algorithms. However, satisfactory results still cannot be 
obtained due to two issues: (A) There can be countless kinds of bot and human 
transactions existing, with different operation frequencies, combinations of operations 
and density dispersions. This makes the limited training set cannot cover all possible 
application scenarios; (B) The training sets we have now still features different time 
durations, range from two seconds to one minute, increasing challenges for the learning 
model convergence. 
As a solution for these two issues, we designed a new cluster algorithm named 
Clustering Based on Density Sort and Valley Point Competition to subdivide the 
 20 
transaction level data into more basic operation level data. The key idea is, one OSN 
transaction is a combination of different basic operations. When bots and humans are 
performing single operation in OSNs (such as tweeting, clicking like button and making 
comment), the flow density is relatively higher than other inactive time. We can identify 
legitimate users' and bots' transactions by performing the classification of bot operations 
versus human operations. Based on experimental results, it is much easier to differentiate 
bot operations from human operations through NetFlow data. 
 
The pseudocode of the algorithm is shown above, which takes one dataset and 
radius threshold value r as input. We first extract the flow fingerprint matrix's incoming 
and outgoing bps rows out, sum the values from the same column together to generate a 
new 1 × 200 matrix. Then take the new matrix as input dataset D, treat the value from 
each column as single data point. 
Density 
For one data point p, there is a dataset D containing all the points within a r radius of p. 
Then the density of p is summation of all the D's belonging points' bps values. 
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Potential Point 
For a cluster D, its potential point p should be within a r radius of one of D's 
belonging point b. 
∃b ∈ {x|x ∈ D ∧ dist(x, p) < r} 
Valley Point 
For point a, if it is the potential point of two or more clusters, then a is the valley 
point of the neighboring clusters. 
Valley Point Competition 
Once some clusters are border by and a valley point appears, we need to make 
judgement for how we should label that point. We have three choices here: (1) Combine 
all the clusters together and make the point as the combined cluster's belonging; (2) 
Combine some of the clusters together and label the point as the combined cluster's 
belonging; (3) Do not combine any of them, just assign the valley point to one of the 
clusters. 
The process of making the choice is called valley point competition. In this 
algorithm, if the density of the valley is larger than 50% of its around clusters' center 
density, then we combine all the around clusters together and assign the valley point to 
the combined cluster. If the density is less than 50% of its around clusters, then we assign 
the valley point to the clusters with smallest number of belongings. 
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Figure 6. Subdivision example 
Machine Learning 
The machine learning module uses operation level data labeled as bot flows and 
legitimate flows to train the classification model. The prediction process also input 
operation level data to analyze. Instead of outputting the result directly, it enables each 
operation level data vote for its transaction level data's identity. This strategy makes the 
sensitivity of the detection method can be controlled by setting different passing lines of 
voting. 
We used keras (F Chollet, 2015) with TensorFlow (M Abadi, 2016) to construct 
the learning model. Since it is nonlinear high-dimensional data training, Multilayer 
Perceptron (MLP) and Conventional Neural Network (CNN) are used as training 
approaches. 
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As stated before, due to the customizability of ToS field, two versions of data are 
engaged to separately train two versions of models as a comparison to test the 





We first evaluated the subdivision component to see whether the Clustering Based 
on Density Sort and Valley Point Competition algorithm can divide the transaction level 
flows into operation level flows correctly. 
The algorithm takes one radius threshold parameter r as input, whose unit is pixel 
length. Different r values can generate different subdivision results and eventually make 
differences to detection outcome. Figure 7 is the line chart that shows the clustering 
purity scores with different r values. The horizontal axis represents the values of r and the 
vertical axis represents the purity score of the resulted clusters  (purity =
1
𝑁
∑ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑗|𝑐𝑖 ∩ 𝑡𝑗|𝑘𝑖=1 , where N is the number of data points, k denotes the number of 
clusters, 𝑐𝑖 is a cluster in C, and 𝑡𝑗 is the cluster generated by the algorithm which has the 
maximum count for cluster 𝑐𝑖). We can see the algorithm is very sensitive to r parameter, 
and optimal results can be generated when r is in the range of 18 to 22. For traffic 
generated by bots, the subdivision module works well, can achieve up to 93.58% purity 
when r=23, that's because bots' operations mostly utilize API to perform, making the 
traffics have very clear flow fingerprint for classification (tend to be short and 
concentrate). For legitimate transactions, the clustering result is inferior to bot 
transactions. The maximal purity score we can achieve is 78.32% when r=26 and 
legitimate transactions are more sensitive to the variation r. One reason is the boundaries 
of different operations in legitimate transactions are blurry in flow level data. Almost all 
the OSN websites have lots of EventListeners embedded into the HTML to preload the 
contents dynamically, which fills in the blanks between operations. In addition, we rely 
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on manual recording to label legitimate transactions, which adds the impreciseness to 
evaluation. 
 
Figure 7. Purity scores with different r values 
The ultimate goal of subdivision is not precisely partition all the operations, 
instead, it is designed to make the data more diacritical to help the machine learning 
process. We randomly sampled 100 legitimate transactions and 100 bot transactions, then 
recorded the number of operations and average duration times for each transaction after 
subdivision. Figure 8 is the scatter plot of the result. All the bot transactions are divided 
into relatively shorter operations compared with legitimate flows. Moreover, bots flow 
fingerprints' durations are normalized to the range of 0 second to 15 seconds, while 
legitimate operations distribute in the range of 0 second to 40 seconds. This procedure 
can significantly help the training process. 
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Figure 8. Scatter Diagram for Subdivision 
Figure 9 shows the test result for machine learning module with 6 × 200 matrix 
data (with incoming and outgoing bps, pps and ToS). The test set contains 675 bot 
transactions and 420 legitimate transactions. For both Multilayer Perceptron (MLP) and 
Conventional Neural Network (CNN) algorithms, we used 10-fold cross-validation to 
check whether the model is overfitting. Since multiple actions had been taken to prevent 
the model from overfitting, such as controlling the learning rate η and limit the number of 
iterations, the cross-validation accuracy is very similar to the testing accuracy. As we can 
see in the figure, with subdivision, the accuracy has an improvement of around 20%. As a 
true-or-false classification with the bottom line of 50% accuracy, it is a huge 
improvement. For here, CNN achieves the greatest result, with 93.61% of accuracy. 
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Figure 9. Result for 6*200 matrix version 
 
Figure 10. Result for 4*200 matrix version 
As stated before, in order to guarantee the universality of BotFlowMon, we used 
4 × 200 matrix version data (just with incoming and outgoing bps and pps) to train 
another classification model. The result can be seen in figure 10. Surprisingly, the 
accuracies only get around 1% lower than the 6 × 200 matrix version. The decrease of 
dimensions will reduce the information but also make the model easier to converge, 
especially for MLP. Again, CNN gets the best result in this model. The detailed 
evaluation score for CNN in these two versions of models can be seen in the table below. 
Table 3 
Detailed results for CNN 
 6*200 Matrix 4*200 Matrix 
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Accuracy 0.9361 0.9233 
Precision 0.9887 0.9821 
Recall 0.9067 0.8919 
F1 score 0.9459 0.9348 
 
In real environment, with an accuracy of more than 93%, we can detect most of 
bot traffic. Because one bot can create several transaction level flow fingerprints in a 
specific time range, only one of the transactions is identified as illegimate, the bot can be 
identified. Another concern is false alarm, we want legitimate traffic can 100% pass the 
BotFlowMon system. Benefitting from voting mechanism in machine learning module, 
we can set a strict passing line to adjust the sensitiveness. As experimented, if a 
transaction can be labeled as illegimate only when more than 75% of the operations are 
judged as illegimate, there will be no false alarms in this system, but the accuracy will 





With the rapid increasing of social bots activities, it becomes more and more 
meaningful to develop an efficient social bots detection system. Compared with the 
previous methods to limit social bots, BotFlowMon has the following advantages: (1) 
Only NetFlow data will be involved to finish the whole detection procedure, which 
avoids damaging the privacy of the users; (2) Due to its operating mechanism, this 
system is easy to deploy. We only need to mirror NetFlow data from routers to 
BotFlowMon system. (3) Have relatively higher accuracy compared with content-based 
detection methods. 
There are still lots of works need to be done in the future. This detection system 
can be transferred into a real-time monitor system, which poses a velocity challenge; the 
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